We show that modal logics characterized by a class of frames satisfying the insertion property are suitable for Reiter's default logic. We re ne the canonical x point construction de ned by Marek, Schwarz and Truszczy nski for Reiter's default logic and thus we address a new paradigm for nonmonotonic logic. In fact, di erently from the construction de ned by these authors, we show that suitable modal logics for such a construction must indeed contain KD4. When re exivity is added to the modal logic used for the x point construction then we come to the Marek Schwarz and Truszczy nski framework for Reiter's default logic. Our framework, in fact, is appropriate also to the family of modal logics in between S4 and S4f. If, instead, re exivity is dropped, then we show that a new family of modal logics is gained, namely the modal logics in between KD4 and KD4Z. The upper bound can be extended to the modal logic KD4LZ whenever the propositional language taken into account is nite.
Introduction
Modal nonmonotonic reasoning was pioneered by the works of McDermott and Doyle (see 14, 13] ). In their approach the basic idea for formalizing a nonmonotonic inference operator is to use, as additional defeasible assumptions, whatever cannot be inferred from the so-called belief set or knowledge state of a rational agent. Specifically, they de ne nonmonotonic extensions of a theory I to be the x points of the equation: T = Cn PC (I f3 : : 6 2 T g), where PC is propositional logic and 3 is a sentence meaning that is consistent with T .
INTRODUCTION 9
After the rst modal translation of default logic given by Konolige 7] , all the further studies focused, in fact, on the connection between Moore's notion of groundedness in autoepistemic logic and suitable variations on the modal representation of default logic. The breakthrough in the modal study of default logic came from Marek, Shwartz and Truszczy nski in 19, 10, 24, 11, 12, 9, 20] Generalizing the modal logic N to any modal logic that contains N, Marek and Truszczy nski de ne a new framework to represent nonmonotonic reasoning. In this framework the stable sets of Stalnaker and the autoepistemic logic of Moore can be easily described, while Reiter's default logic is characterized by a family of logics in between the subnormal logic N and S4f.
In this paper we study a new framework for the x point construction of Reiter extensions. In this framework all the formul involved are boxed, (a boxed formula has all the propositional variables under the scope of the modal operator 2). We introduce the modal expansions T of I according to the following paradigm:
is in T if and only if the provability of can be derived by means of the modal logic from the set I of formul and the set of unprovable formul of T '. When I refers to a default theory hW; Di then I is: 2W f2 ^23 ! 2 : : = 2 Dg.
More formally:
2 T $ 2 2 Cn (I f:2 : 6 2 T g) that is:
Cn (2T ) = Cn (I f:2 : 6 2 T g)
In this paper we discuss the following items stemming from the above equation:
(1) The modal logics which are suitable for Reiter's default logic are extensions of KD4. In Section 2 we discuss why KD4 should be considered the minimal monotonic modal logic for nonmonotonic reasoning. of is provable then is true') since Truszczy nski needs the axiom of re exivity to prove the representation theorem for Reiter's default logic. The Truszczy nski translation seems to be more coherent than the Marek and Truszczy nszki one, in that the description of the default is consistently done by using modal logic as a metalanguage. We can, indeed, use that translation without resorting to the axiom of re exivity (see Section 3 for the comparison). (4) We have found a`structural' property of the logic (see the Insertion Lemma in Section 2) that ensures the completeness theorem with respect to Reiter's default logic. In other words, the completeness theorem proof depends just on this structural property, which is that the logic must be complete with respect to a class of frames containing a proper subclass F 0 which is closed with respect to the insertion of arbitrary worlds (see Section 2 and the Remark in Section 4).
Preliminaries: modal logics for nonmonotonic reasoning
In the sequel, the letter L denotes the set of well formed formul of propositional logic PC while L 2 is that of the modal language; denotes any normal modal logic; the minimal subnormal modal logic N contains the tautologies of PC, and is closed under the universal substitution rule US, modus ponens MP and necessitation Nec; K is the minimal normal modal logic which extends N with the normality axiom 2( ! ) ! ( KD4Z is complete with respect to the class G of nite frames hW; R; V i with a last cluster V and such that the frame restricted to the set W ?V is transitive, irre exive with a rst element.
Proof. Consider the canonical model of KD4Z and the submodel generated by a maximal consistent set w 0 containing the negation of a formula A which is not a theorem of KD4Z. Consider the transitive ltration M = hW; R; j =i of this submodel with respect the set of all subformul of A: it is nite, serial, transitive and with a rst element. Since W is nite then seriality implies that any last world (a world which has no greater elements) must be in a cluster V . However a world w, not in a terminal cluster, might be re exive: hence it might be contained in a non-terminal cluster: moreover, there might be more than two terminal clusters. We now show that we can suitably modify the model M into a model M 0 , de ned on the same set of worlds W, such that M; w j = A i M 0 ; w j = A. Suppose that w is contained in a cluster U which is not terminal. Let us prove that if w 6 j = 2 then there is a successor world u not in U such that u 6 j = : if not then V j = 2 , where V is any terminal cluster after U, hence w j = 32 . By the axiom Z, which holds in w, we have w 6 j = 2(2 ! ), that is there is u j = 2 and u 6 j = ; but w 6 j = 2 and u j = 2 imply that u must not be in U. If we order all non-terminal clusters U with an arbitrary strict linear order (possibly empty if U has just one element) then we can de ne a new relation R 0 on W and model M 0 = hW; R 0 ; j = 0 i such that M; w j = i M 0 ; w j = 0 . M 0 is then transitive, irre exive for all hu; vi not in the terminal clusters U. Now suppose that there are two terminal clusters V and V 0 : if we prove that for all formul , such that V 0 j = i V j = then we can put V and V 0 in the same cluster and have a unique last cluster. If V j = 2 then w 0 j = 32 , where w 0 is the rst element; hence V 0 j = 2(2 ! ) ! 2 , by the axiom Z; now in the last cluster V 0 j = 2 ! therefore V 0 j = 2(2 ! ) hence V 0 j = 2 . This completes the proof.
By adding the linearity axiom L to KD4Z we have that KD4LZ is complete with respect to the class B of balloons 6], namely the models M = hW; R; V j =i where the frames hW; R; V i are nite, have a unique last cluster V , and the frame restricted to the set W ?V is linear, irre exive and with a rst element. KD4LZ is complete also with respect to the frame hw; <i.
We recall the notion of p-morphism between two frames F 1 = hW 1 ; R 1 i, and F 2 = hW 2 ; R 2 i: it is a function f from W 1 to W 2 such that if wR 1 u then f(w)R 2 f(u); if f(w)R 2 y then for some u, u 2 W 1 , f(u) = y and wR 1 u. Moreover, if M 1 = hW 1 ; R 1 ; j = 1 i and M 2 = hW 2 ; R 2 ; j = 2 i are such that s j = 1 q i f(s) j = 2 q, for all propositional variables q, then M 2 is a p-morphic image of M 1 and for all formul A, s j = 1 A i f(s) j = 2 A. Let F and F be two classes of frames and let any frame of F be a p-morphic image of a frame of F . Let be a logic sound both with respect to the class of frames F and F . In such a hypothesis, if F is complete with respect to the logic then also F is complete with respect to . Proposition 2.2 KD4Z is complete with respect to the class G of frames hW; R; V i with the last cluster V and such that the frame restricted to W -V is nite, transitive, irre exive and with a rst element.
Proof. Let F be a class of frame with a nite last cluster. Let F be a class of frames obtained by substituting the nite last cluster V of any frame of F with an arbitrary cluster V 0 with V V 0 . Then all the mapping f, where f is the identity, is not in V 0 ? V and f(V 0 ? V ) V , de ne a class of p-morphisms from F to F.
By exploiting p-morphisms we can further enlarge the class of frames of proposition 2.2 to that in which all frames hW; R; V i restricted to W ? V are still transitive and discrete, but in general not nite; this is achieved by the class of frames with a last cluster and where the relation R on W ?V is transitive, irre exive, with a rst element and of nite depth, as described below.
A frame F is of nite depth if there is an integer n such that for all w 1 ,: : :,w n , w n+1 2 W ? V , w 1 R : : : Rw n Rw n+1 does not hold. The minimal such a n is called the depth of the frame.
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Let F be a class of frames hW; R; V i with the last cluster V . 
In fact, if we take McDermott and Doyle's paradigm, as argued above, the nonmonotonic deductive closure of a set of formul is given by any theory T , which is the deductive closure of the set I of premises and of the set of formul stating the unprovability of those formul not in T . If 2A stands for`A is provable in the theory S' then the dual relation 3A might be taken as`A is consistent with S' and 3> as`S is consistent'. It turns out that the role played by the theory S is relevant. For example, in his famous paper 4], G odel has shown the unprovability of consistency in rst order Peano arithmetics PA: indeed, taking the modal translation G of PA 2 , and also of many other formal theories including rst order logic with equality, if we add to it 3> then we get an inconsistency. On the contrary, in the nonmonotonic formulation of the x point construction, any proof-theoretic notion must be based on a xed context. That is, one cannot give a notion of proof which is e ective for any set of formul of the logic. It seems that the dependency on the context is a cunning way of avoiding such a problem. In fact, the problem of determining whether a formula is a theorem of the logic is reduced to that of determining whether or not it belongs to a devised set of formul .
For example let X be a recursively enumerable but not recursive set of integers and let hW; Di be the default theory where W is the set of propositional variables fp n : n 2 Xg and D is the set f: :p n =:p n g, where n 6 2 X; then the x point construction yields the Reiter extension W f:p n : n 6 2 Xg, though in default logic we are not able to decide whether all defaults can ever be applied or not.
We argue that in the x point equation 2 is indeed related more to the set-theoretic notion of membership than to that of provability.
On the other hand the x point default construction passes the decidability/undecidability border by dealing indi erently with nitely axiomatizable or trans nite, recursive or undecidable sets of formul . In the case of PA, for example, we may imagine dealing with PA + obtained by adding to PA the trans nite set of all mathematical truths of PA. Under this assumption no false statement in the standard model of arithmetic may be be added to PA + : hence if we assume as a mathematical truth that arithmetic is consistent, then 3> can be added as a theorem in the modal translation of the extended theory PA + , albeit 3> cannot be proved in G. The upshot is that by a suitable translation of the defaults, provability of consistency can be always added in its modal x point equation.
We conclude that a modal logic suitable for dealing with such an`ideal notion' of provability, should contain seriality, normality, transitivity and the necessitation rule as these properties correspond to the so called derivability conditions of the provability operator. By this argument we gather that the minimal modal logic adequate for the modal x point construction for default logic should be KD4 as any weaker modal logics are not su ciently expressive to capture the provability of consistency.
Observe that the system G corresponding to PA has also the L ob rule`G 2A ! A implies`G A. As already pointed out this rule gives an inconsistency with the further hypothesis of 3>: more generally the schema of`the unprovability as failure to prove' yields inconsistency with L ob's rule (if 6 G A then`G :2A hence by tautologỳ G 2A ! A and thus`G A). A consequence of L ob's rule is that the sentences which are equivalent to their provability are all and only the theorems of G. schema needs to be applied to all the formul of the language. In other words, we need a nonmonotonic interpretation of the provability operator, by means of the x point construction, based on the logic : is in T if and only if the provability of can be derived by means of from the set I of formul and the set of unprovable formul of T '.
We show in the next section how the family of modal logics suitable to deal with this interpretation of the provability operator are, in fact, those suitable for Reiter extensions. 4 Reiter's default logic and the provability operator In this section we consider a class of modal logics holding an interesting property: the insertion of sets of worlds. For this class we rst show what we call the Insertion Lemma which we will use to provide a further modal characterization of Reiter's default logic other than those given by Marek and Truszczy nszki. We will give shorter proofs of both soundness and completeness of default translations theorems even for the family of logics intermediate between N and S4f. In the sequel we consider a logic KD4. Let have a class C of models with the last cluster. We say that C is closed with respect to insertion of sets U if for any M = hW; R; V; j =i 2 C and set U of worlds with U \W empty, there is a model M 0 = hW 0 ; R 0 ; V 0 j = 0 i 2 C satisfying the following properties:
1. R R 0 , W U = W 0 and V = V 0 ; 2. UR 0 V , where V is the last cluster of both M and M 0 (U precedes the last cluster); 3. there is a w in W 0 such that wR 0 U and for all x, x 6 2 U with wR 0 x, is UR 0 x. That is, there is an element w in M 0 preceding U such that all x which come after w in M come after U in M 0 ; 4. if w 2 W and p is a propositional variable, then M; w j = p i M 0 ; w j = p. U ]M denotes such a model extending M with U as a set of new worlds. Note that if w is a re exive world then U is contained in a cluster containing w as well. Suppose that the class C of models with the last cluster is de ned through frame validity (e.g. C is the set of all models whose frames are in F, where F is de ned by some closure conditions on the relation R). In such a case U ] M can be obtained by just adding U to the frame hW; Ri of F as in the de nition of insertion, updating the frame by means of the closure conditions on the accessibility relation, and nally by extending the classical interpretations of U and of those elements preceding U in the new frame to the modal language L 2 via the forcing relation. Obviously KD4Z and KD4LZ have their respective class of models G and B closed with respect to insertion of nite sets U of worlds: in fact for any nite set of worlds U and for any M in G (or B ) we can easily de ne U ] M in G (or U ] M with M 2 B). In fact, if the frame restricted to the set W -V is transitive (or linear), irre exive and nite with rst element then by adding U 3 in between a world w and any successor v of it, where w is in the set W -V 4 , we can always obtain a transitive (or linear), irre exive and nite frame with rst element. In an analogous way it is possible to show that KD4Z has a class of models G closed with respect to insertion of arbitrary sets U of worlds. By the way, also the logic S4f has a class of models that is closed with respect to insertion: indeed S4f is complete with respect to the class of frames for which the frame hW; R; V i has a unique last cluster V , and such that the frame restricted to the set W-V is also a cluster 12, 18] . (See Fig. 1 ) Proposition 4.1 (Insertion Lemma) KD4Z and S4f have a class of frames closed with respect to the insertion of arbitrary sets U of worlds whereas KD4LZ has a class of frames closed with respect to insertion of nite sets U.
In the sequel I denotes the set 2W f2 ^23 ! 2 : : = 2 Dg where hW; Di is a default propositional theory; c T denotes the set f : 6 2 T g; 2T denotes the set f2 : 2 T g, :2 c T denotes the set f:2 : 2 6 2 T g; if S L then St(S) is the unique stable set containing S. A formula is said to be boxed if any propositional variable is in the scope of a modal operator: for example I is a set of boxed formul .
A boxed x point equation for a set I of boxed formul is of the form (1) Cn (I :2 c T ) = Cn (2T ) Any modal theory T which is a solution of this equation is called a boxed expansion.
We will see below that this notion of x point admits, for KD4, a class of modal logics suitable to capture Reiter's default logic larger than that given by the McDermott's paradigm 14] :
(2) Cn (I :2 c T ) = T 3 In case of B we can totally order U. 4 if W -V is empty make a copy of an arbitrary world of U and put it as rst world w. with this translation default logic is captured by any subnormal logic with re exivity, that is T S4f. However, as we have argued, this result leads to the un-boxed version of I with respect to (2), since Truszczy nski needs the axiom T to prove the soundness part of the statment that the stable sets of Reiter extensions are x points of (2). For the completeness part, if T = Cn (f2 ^23 ! 2 : : = 2 Dg 2W :2 c T ) then, by applying the closure operator Cn S4 on this equality, and by taking into account that T is a stable set, T is an expansion for 2W f2 ^23 ! 2 : : = 2 Dg in (2) when S4. Then T Cn S4 (f2 ^23 ! : : = 2 Dg W :2 c T ) by reexivity. The converse inclusion can be obtained by necessitation, K and transitivity on f2 ^23 ! : : = 2 Dg W. Now, we consider the boxed version (1) of (2) so, besides the analogous of Marek and Truszczy nski's family KD4 S4f we nd an alternative family of modal logics , KD4 KD4Z which do the same job. This result can be extended to the family of , KD KD4LZ, by considering only a modal language with a nite number of propositional variables.
REITER'S DEFAULT LOGIC AND THE PROVABILITY
Re exivity is then not compatible with this family (indeed enlarging KD4Z with density we have the euclidean axiom 5). We have said above that equation (1) is more general than (2) because the xpoint equation (2) (S) and, from the hypothesis, M j = 2:2 , which leads to a contradiction by seriality and transitivity. Then 2 S, for 2 L. Since u j = 23 then for some v and w (that exist by seriality) with uRvRw is w 6 j = : ; moreover w j = S, because M j = 2St(S), i.e. : 6 2 S, because 2 L. Since S is a Reiter extension then f2 ^23 ! 2 2 I implies 2 S, hence M j = 2 , and nally u j = I. We have proved that M j = 2St(S) implies M j = Cn (I :2 c T ).
Conversely, let M j = I :2 c St(S) and let ' be any formula in St(S). Let us prove that M j = 2'. We prove it by induction on the complexity of the formula ' and we distinguish two cases: whether ' is objective 5 or not. If ' is objective then there is a proof ' 1 ; : : : ; ' n = '. Suppose that for all i < n M j = 2' i . Either ' n 2 W, and in such a case 2W I, or ' n is a tautology, and again M j = 2' n or ' n is a conclusion of some default : = of hW; Di where = ' i for some i, i < n, = ' n and : 6 2 S. M j = I implies M j = 23 ! 2' n . Now, as : 6 2 S, M j = I :2 c St(S) implies M j = 3 . This proves that M j = 2' n . Moreover, if modus ponens is used then the axiom K preserves consequences under the connective 2.
Suppose, now, that ' is not objective. The basic case has been already considered with ' objective. Now, for the inductive step, there is a modal formula which is tautologically equivalent to ', of the form: V We must have wRU,by de nition of insertion, hence by irre exivity of the worlds not in the last cluster V , for some u in U, u j = : and U j = . Thus S` . Hence there is a S n such that S n` and is consistent with T then, by de nition of S, S n+1` which is a contradiction with u j = : . L \ T coincides with S, so L \ T is a Reiter extension. Remark 5.2 The above proof exploits only some properties of the models of KD4Z. Namely:
1. The logic extends KD4. is closed with respect to the insertion of arbitrary U. The proof can be easily given for all logics extending KD4 for which the Lemma Insertion can be given for a proper subclass F 0 of the frames of . In the previous proof we have only to distinguish two cases: the model M = hW; R; j =i satisfying T has an irre exive world or not. The irre exive case is exactly as in the previous theorem. With a little variation in the case in which no world w in W ?V is irre exive, as for S4f, we note that, in the nal part of the proof both w and U are in the same cluster, by de nition of insertion of U after w, thus w j = 2 ^23 would imply again S` , and consistent with T , hence S` , by de nition of S: but U j = and w j = :2 would imply x j = : for some x not in U which is a contradiction because x is a world of M which satis es L \ T and S is contained in L \ T . Thus we can extend the previous result as follows: Theorem 5.3 Let be a logic and F a class of frames complete with respect to . Suppose that the Insertion Lemma holds for a proper subclass F 0 of F. Then L \ T is a Reiter extension when T is a boxed expansion of I. KD4Z. Cn (I :2 c T ) = Cn (2T ) i L\T is a Reiter extension. Proof. The only fact to prove is that if Cn (I :2 c T ) = Cn (2T ) then L \ T is a Reiter extension. By applying Cn KD4Z on the above equality we get Cn KD4Z (I :2 c T ) = Cn KD4Z (2T ) and then L \ T is a Reiter extension. As for KD4LZ, the Lemma Insertion holds only when U is a nite set; then the theorem holds when the number of propositional variables is nite. Theorem 5.5 Let be KD4LZ and let L have a nite number of propositional variables. Cn (I :2 c T ) = Cn (2T ) i L \ T is a Reiter extension.
COMPLETENESS THEOREM FOR REITER EXTENSIONS IN KD4Z 21

